Summary. Quorum systems are well-known tools for ensuring the consistency and availability of replicated data despite the benign failure of data repositories. In this paper we consider the arbitrary (Byzantine) failure of data repositories and present the first study of quorum system requirements and constructions that ensure data availability and consistency despite these failures. We also consider the load associated with our quorum systems, i.e., the minimal access probability of the busiest server. For services subject to arbitrary failures, we demonstrate quorum systems over n servers with a load of O(
Introduction
A well known way to enhance the availability and efficiency of replicated data is by using quorums. A quorum system for a universe of data servers is a collection of subsets of servers, each pair of which intersect. Intuitively, each quorum can operate on behalf of the system, thus increasing its availability and performance, while the intersection property guarantees that operations done on distinct quorums preserve consistency.
In this paper we consider the arbitrary (Byzantine) failure of clients and servers, and initiate the study of quorum systems in this model. Intuitively, a quorum system tolerant of Byzantine failures is a collection of subsets of servers, each pair of which intersect in a set containing sufficiently many correct servers to guarantee consistency of the replicated data as seen by clients. We provide the following contributions.
1. We define the class of masking quorum systems, with which data can be consistently replicated in a way that is resilient to the arbitrary failure of data repositories. We show necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of masking quorum systems under different failure assumptions, and present several example constructions of such systems. 2. We explore two variations of masking quorum systems.
The first, called dissemination quorum systems, is suited for services that receive and distribute self-verifying information from correct clients (e.g., digitally signed values) that faulty servers can fail to redistribute but cannot undetectably alter. The second variation, called opaque masking quorum systems, is similar to regular masking quorums in that it makes no assumption of self-verifying data, but it differs in that clients do not need to know the failure scenarios for which the service was designed. This somewhat simplifies the protocol by which clients access the replicated data and, in the case that failures are maliciously induced, reveals less information to clients that could guide an attack attempting to compromise the system. 3. We explore the load of each type of quorum system, where the load of a quorum system is the minimal access probability of the busiest server, minimizing over all strategies for picking quorums. We present a masking quorum system with the property that its load over a total of n servers is O(
), thereby meeting the lower bound for the load of benignly-fault-tolerant quorum systems. For opaque masking quorum systems, we prove a lower bound of 1 2 on the load, and present a construction that meets this lower bound and proves it tight. 4 . For services that use masking quorums (opaque or not), we show how to deal with faulty clients in addition to faulty servers. The primary challenge raised by client failures is that there is no guarantee that clients will update quorums according to any specified protocol. Thus, a faulty client could leave the replicated data in an inconsistent and irrecoverable state. We develop an update protocol, by which clients update the replicated data, that prevents clients from leaving the data in an inconsistent state. The protocol has the desirable property that it involves only the quorum at which an access is attempted, while providing system-wide consistency properties.
Our quorum systems, if used in conjunction with appropriate protocols and synchronization mechanisms, can be used to implement a wide range of data semantics. In this paper, however, we choose to demonstrate a variable supporting read and write operations with relatively weak semantics, in order to maintain focus on our quorum constructions. These semantics imply a safe variable [20] , which a set of correct clients can use to build other abstractions, e.g., atomic, multi-writer multi-reader registers [18, 20, 21] , concurrent timestamp systems [10, 17] , l-exclusion [2, 9] , and atomic snapshot scan [1, 5] .
Our quorum systems can be used for building other protocols in addition to shared read/write register emulation. For example, in an ongoing effort [25] , we use Byzantine quorum systems in constructing a large-scale, survivable service supporting persistent data abstractions such as consensus objects [24] , locks and files. In addition, in Sect. 6, we demonstrate how masking quorum systems can be used to guarantee consistency and completion of updates, even those executed by faulty clients.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin in Sect. 2 with a description of related work. In Sect. 3 we present our system model and definitions. We present quorum systems for the replication of arbitrary data subject to arbitrary server failures in Sect. 4, and in Sect. 5 we present two variations of these systems. We then detail an access protocol for replicated services that tolerate faulty clients in addition to faulty servers in Sect. 6. We conclude in Sect. 7.
Related work
Our work was influenced by the substantial body of literature on quorum systems for benign failures and applications that make use of them, e.g., [4, 7, 11-13, 15, 22, 31, 37] . In particular, our grid construction of Sect. 4 was influenced by grid-like constructions for benign failures (e.g., [7] ), and we borrow our definition of load from [31] .
Quorum systems have been previously employed in the implementation of security mechanisms. Naor and Wool [32] described methods to construct an access-control service using quorums. Their constructions use cryptographic techniques to ensure that out-of-date (but correct) servers cannot grant access to unauthorized users. Agrawal and El Abbadi [3] and Mukkamala [30] considered the confidentiality of replicated data despite the disclosure of the contents of a threshold of the (otherwise correct) repositories. Their constructions used quorums with increased intersection, combined with Rabin's dispersal scheme [33] , to enhance the confidentiality and availability of the data despite some servers crashing or their contents being observed. Our work differs from all of the above by considering arbitrarily faulty servers, and accommodating failure scenarios beyond a simple threshold of servers.
Herlihy and Tygar [16] applied quorums with increased intersection to the problem of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of replicated data against a threshold of arbitrarily faulty servers. In their constructions, replicated data is stored encrypted under a key that is shared among the servers using a threshold secret-sharing scheme [35] , and each client accesses a threshold number of servers to reconstruct the key prior to performing (encrypted) reads and writes. This construction exhibits one approach to make replicated data self-verifying via encryption, and thus the quorum system they develop is a special case of our dissemination quorum systems, i.e., for a threshold of faulty servers.
Since the initial conference publication of this work [23] , several works that build upon its contributions have appeared. A subsequent paper [27] is devoted to constructions of masking quorum systems for the special case of a threshold of faulty servers. Bazzi [6] explored a variation of our quorum systems for synchronous systems. Probabilistic constructions for dissemination and masking quorum systems are explored in [28] and [29] , respectively. A practical effort for building a large-scale survivable data repository using Byzantine quorums is described in [24] , and the construction of a survivable consensus object in this context is described in [25] .
Preliminaries

System model
We assume a universe U of servers, |U | = n, and an arbitrary number of clients that are distinct from the servers. A quorum system Q ⊆ 2 U is a non-empty set of subsets of U , every pair of which intersect. Each Q ∈ Q is called a quorum.
Servers (and clients) that obey their specifications are correct. A faulty server, however, may deviate from its specification arbitrarily. A fail-prone system B ⊆ 2 U is a nonempty set of subsets of U , none of which is contained in another, such that some B ∈ B contains all the faulty servers. The fail-prone system represents an assumption characterizing the failure scenarios that can occur, and could express typical assumptions that up to a threshold of servers fail (e.g., the sets B 1 , . . . , B k could be all sets of f servers), but it also generalizes to allow less uniform assumptions. For example, servers in physical proximity to each other or in the same administrative domain may exhibit correlated probabilities of being captured, or servers with identical hardware and software platforms may have correlated probabilities of electronic penetration. By exploiting such correlations (i.e., knowledge of the collection B ), we can design quorum systems that more effectively mask faulty servers.
In the remainder of this section, and throughout Sects. 4 and 5, we assume that clients behave correctly. In Sect. 6 we will relax this assumption (and will be explicit when we do so).
We assume that any two processes (clients or servers) can communicate over a point-to-point channel. If both endpoints of the channel are correct, then this channel is both authenticated and reliable. That is, a correct process receives a message from another correct process if and only if the other correct process sent it. However, we do not assume known bounds on message transmission times; i.e., communication is asynchronous.
Access protocol
We consider a problem in which the clients perform read and write operations on a variable x that is replicated at each server in the universe U . A copy of the variable x is stored at each server, along with a timestamp value t. Timestamps are assigned by a client to each replica of the variable when the client writes the replica. Our protocols require that different clients choose different timestamps, and thus each client c chooses its timestamps from some globally-known set T c that does not intersect T c for any other client c . The timestamps in T c can be formed, e.g., as integers appended with the name of c in the low-order bits. The read and write operations are implemented as follows.
Write. For a client c to write the value v, it queries servers to obtain a set of timestamps A = {<t u >} u∈Q for some quorum Q; chooses a timestamp t ∈ T c greater than the highest timestamp value in A and greater than any timestamp it has chosen in the past; and sends the update <v, t> to servers until it has received an acknowledgement for this update from every server in some quorum Q .
Read. For a client to read x, it queries servers to obtain a set of value/timestamp pairs A = {<v u , t u >} u∈Q for some quorum Q. The client then applies a deterministic function Result() to A to obtain the result Result(A) of the read operation.
In the case of a write operation, each server updates its local variable and timestamp to the received values <v, t> only if t is greater than the timestamp currently associated with the variable. In any case, it returns an acknowledgement to the client.
Two points about this description deserve further discussion. First, the nature of the quorums Q and the function Result() are intentionally left unspecified; further clarification of these are the point of this paper. Second, read and write operations need to exchange messages with a full quorum of servers. For example, the read operation requires a client to obtain a set A containing value/timestamp pairs from every server in some quorum Q. This requirement stems from our lack of synchrony assumptions on the network: in general, the only way that a client can know that it has accessed every correct server in a quorum is to access every server in the quorum. Our framework guarantees the availability of a quorum at any moment, and thus by attempting the operation at multiple quorums, a client can eventually make progress. In some cases, the client can achieve progress by incrementally accessing servers until it obtains responses from a quorum of them.
In Sects. 4 and 5, we will argue the correctness of the above protocol-instantiated with quorums and a Result() function that we will define-according to the following semantics; a more formal treatment of these concepts can be found in [20] . We say that a read operation begins when the client initiates the operation and ends when the client determines the read result; an operation to write value v with timestamp t begins when the client initiates it and ends when all correct servers in some quorum have received the update <v, t>. An operation op 1 precedes an operation op 2 if op 1 ends before op 2 begins (in real time). If op 1 does not precede op 2 and op 2 does not precede op 1 , then they are called concurrent. Given a set of operations, a serialization of those operations is a total ordering on them that extends the precedence ordering among them. Then, for the above protocol to be correct, we require that any read that is concurrent with no writes returns the last value written in some serialization of the preceding writes. This will immediately imply safe variable semantics [20] .
Load
A measure of the inherent performance of a quorum system is its load [31] , defined as follows: Given a quorum system Q , an access strategy w is a probability distribution on the elements of Q ; i.e., Q∈Q w(Q) = 1. w(Q) is the probability that quorum Q will be chosen when the service is accessed. Load is then defined as follows: Definition 3.1 Let a strategy w be given for a quorum system
The system load (or just load) on a quorum system Q is
where the minimum is taken over all strategies.
We reiterate that the load is a best case definition. The load of the quorum system will be achieved only if an optimal access strategy is used, and only in the case that no failures occur. A strength of this definition is that load is a property of a quorum system, and not of the protocol using it. A comparison of the definition of load to other seemingly plausible definitions is given in [31] .
Masking quorum systems
In this section we introduce masking quorum systems, which can be used to mask the arbitrarily faulty behavior of data repositories. To motivate our definition, suppose that the replicated variable x is written with quorum Q 1 , and that subsequently x is read using quorum Q 2 . If B is the set of arbitrarily faulty servers, then the following is obtained by reading from Q 2 : the correct value for x is obtained from each server in (Q 1 ∩ Q 2 ) \ B (see Fig. 1 ); out-of-date values are obtained from Q 2 \ (Q 1 ∪ B); and arbitrary values are obtained from Q 2 ∩ B. In order for the client to obtain the correct value, the client must be able to identify the most up-to-date value/timestamp pair as one returned by a set of servers that could not all be faulty. This yields requirement M-Consistency below. In addition, since communication is asynchronous and thus accurate failure detection is not possible, in order for a client to know it completes an operation with all the correct servers of some quorum, it must be able to obtain responses from a full quorum. Therefore, for availability we require that there be no set of faulty servers that intersects all quorums. 
For example, in the case that at most f servers can fail, M-Consistency guarantees that every pair of quorums intersect in at least 2f + 1 elements, and thus in f + 1 correct ones. If a read operation accepts only a value returned by at least f + 1 servers, then any accepted value was returned by at least one correct server.
More generally, the masking quorum system requirements enable a client to obtain the correct answer from the service despite the Byzantine failure of any fail-prone set. The write operation is implemented as described in Sect. 3. To obtain the correct value of x from a read operation, the client reads a set of value/timestamp pairs from a quorum Q, discards values that are returned from any B ∈ B or subsets thereof, and chooses among the remaining values the one with the highest timestamp. This guarantees correctness of the returned value/timestamp pair, which was received from some set B + ⊆ Q of servers, where B + is not contained in any B ∈ B and therefore must contain at least one correct server. Furthermore, it is easy to see that if the most recent write has completed in quorum Q , then all of the servers in Q ∩ Q \ B will return this most up-to-date value, and since by definition Q ∩ Q \ B is not contained in any B ∈ B , this value will be returned by the read operation. The read operation is thus as follows:
Read. For a client to read a variable x, it queries servers to obtain a set of value/timestamp pairs A = {<v u , t u >} u∈Q for some quorum Q. The client computes the set
The client then chooses the pair <v, t> in A with the highest timestamp, and chooses v as the result of the read operation; if A is empty, the client returns ⊥ (a null value, which indicates that the read failed).
Lemma 4.2 A read operation that is concurrent with no write operations returns the value written by the last preceding write operation in some serialization of all preceding write operations.
Proof. Let W denote the set of write operations preceding the read. The read operation will return the value written in the write operation in W with the highest timestamp, since, by the construction of masking quorum systems, this value/timestamp pair will appear in A and will have the highest timestamp in A (any pair with a higher timestamp will be returned only by servers in some B ∈ B ). So, it suffices to argue that there is a serialization of the writes in W in which this write operation appears last, or in other words, that this write operation precedes no other write operation in W . This is immediate, however, as if it did precede another write operation in W , that write operation would have a higher timestamp.
This lemma implies that the protocol above implements a multi-writer multi-reader safe variable [20] . A failure value (⊥) may be returned when some write overlaps a read operation. From safe variables multi-writer multi-reader atomic variables can be built using well-known constructions [18, 20, 21] .
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a masking quorum system (and a construction for one, if it exists) for any given fail-prone system B is given in the following theorem: Theorem 4.3 Let B be a fail-prone system for a universe U . Then there exists a masking quorum system for B iff Q = {U \ B : B ∈ B } is a masking quorum system for B .
Proof. Obviously, if Q is a masking quorum system for B , then one exists. To show the converse, assume that Q is not a masking quorum. Since M-Availability holds in Q by construction, there exist Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ Q and B , B ∈ B , such that (Q 1 ∩Q 2 )\B ⊆ B . Let B 1 = U \Q 1 and B 2 = U \Q 2 . By the construction of Q , we know that B 1 , B 2 ∈ B . By M-Availability, any masking quorum system for B must contain quorums Q 1 ⊆ Q 1 , Q 2 ⊆ Q 2 . However, for any such
violating M-Consistency. Therefore, there does not exist a masking quorum system for B under the assumption that Q is not a masking quorum system for B .
Corollary 4.4 Let B be a fail-prone system for a universe U . Then there exists a masking quorum system for B iff for all
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, there is a masking quorum for B iff Q = {U \ B : B ∈ B } is a masking quorum for B . By construction, Q is a masking quorum iff M-Consistency holds for Q , i.e., iff for all B 1 , B 2 , B 3 , B 4 ∈ B :
The existence criterion for masking quorum systems identified by Theorem 4.3 characterizes all possible masking systems for the fail-prone system B . In particular, the system Q in Theorem 4.3 is dominated (in the sense of [12] ) by any other masking quorum system Q for B , in that for every Q ∈ Q there must exist Q ∈ Q such that Q ⊆ Q. While this provides a characterization of masking quorum systems for any fail-prone system B , it does not help in constructing ones to meet any specific requirements. GarciaMolina and Barbara [12] present techniques for enumerating a certain class of (non-Byzantine) quorum systems. Their methods are not directly applicable for enumerating masking quorum systems, and we leave as an open research topic the question of efficiently mechanizing masking quorum generation. A separate paper [27] provides constructions that are optimal in load and various availability measures for any threshold failure assumption up to the maximum of n/4.
The following theorem was proved in [31] for benignfailure quorum systems, and holds a fortiori for masking quorums (as a result of M-Consistency). Let c(Q ) denote the size of the smallest quorum of Q . } is a masking quorum system for B . M-Consistency is satisfied because any Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ Q will intersect in at least 2f + 1 elements. M-Availability holds because n+2f +1 2 ≤ n − f . A strategy that assigns equal probability to each quorum induces a load of 1 n n+2f +1 2 on the system. By Theorem 4.5, this load is in fact the load of the system.
The following example is interesting since its load decreases as a function of n, and since it demonstrates a method for ensuring system-wide consistency in the face of Byzantine failures while requiring the involvement of fewer than a majority of the correct servers. These advantages are dramatic when n is sufficiently large, e.g., hundreds of servers.
Example 4.7 (Grid quorums)
Suppose that the universe of servers is of size n = k 2 for some integer k and that B = {B ⊆ U : |B| = f }, 3f + 1 ≤ √ n. Arrange the universe into a √ n × √ n grid, as shown in Fig. 2 . Denote the rows and columns of the grid by R i and C i , respectively, where 1 ≤ i ≤ √ n. Then, the quorum system
is a masking quorum system for B . M-Consistency holds since every pair of quorums intersect in at least 2f + 1 elements (the column of one quorum intersects the 2f + 1 rows of the other), and M-Availability holds since for any choice of f faulty elements in the grid, 2f +1 full rows and a column remain available. A strategy that assigns equal probability to each quorum induces a load of
, and again by Theorem 4.5, this is the load of the system.
Note that by choosing
), which asymptotically meets the bounds given in Theorem 4.5. In general, however, this construction yields a load of O(
, which is not optimal: Malkhi et al. [27] show a lower bound of 2f +1
n on the load of any masking quorum system for B = {B ⊆ U : |B| = f }, and provide a construction whose load matches that bound. 
This choice of B could arise, for example, in a wide area network composed of multiple local clusters, each consisting of some B i , and expresses the assumption that at any time, at most one cluster is faulty. Then, any collection of nonempty setsB i ⊆ B i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, can be thought of as 'super-elements' in a universe of size m, with a threshold assumption f = 1 (see Fig. 3 ). Therefore, the following is a masking quorum system for B :
M-Consistency is satisfied because the intersection of any two quorums contains elements from at least three sets in B . M-Availability holds since there is no B ∈ B that intersects all quorums. A strategy that assigns equal probability to each quorum induces a load of 1 m m+3 2 on the system regardless of the size of eachB i , and again Theorem 4.5 implies that this is the load of the system.
If m = k 2 for some k, then a more efficient construction can be achieved by forming the grid construction from Example 4.7 on the 'super elements' {B i }, achieving a load of
.
Variations
Dissemination quorum systems
As a special case of services that can employ quorums in a Byzantine environment, we now consider applications in which the service is a repository for self-verifying information, i.e., information that only clients can create and to which clients can detect any attempted modification by a faulty server. A natural example is a database of public key certificates as found in many public key distribution systems (e.g., [8, 19, 36] ). In its simplest form, a public key certificate is a structure containing a name for a user and a public key, and represents the assertion that the indicated public key can be used to authenticate messages from the indicated user. This structure is digitally signed (e.g., [34] ) by a certification authority so that anyone with the public key of this authority can verify this assertion and, providing it trusts the authority, use the indicated public key to authenticate the indicated user. Due to this signature, it is not possible for a faulty server to undetectably modify a certificate it stores. However, a faulty server can undetectably suppress a change from propagating to clients, simply by ignoring an update from a certification authority. This could have the effect, e.g., of suppressing the revocation of a key that has been compromised. As can be expected, the use of digital signatures to verify data decreases the cost of accessing replicated data. To support such a service, we employ a dissemination quorum system, which has weaker requirements than masking quorums, but which nevertheless ensures that in applications like those above, self-verifying writes will be propagated to all subsequent read operations despite the arbitrary failure of some servers. To achieve this, it suffices for the intersection of every two quorums to not be contained in any set of potentially faulty servers (so that a written value can propagate to a read). This leads to requirement D-Consistency below. And, supposing that operations are required to continue in the face of failures, then due to the lack of accurate failure detection, there should be quorums that a faulty set cannot disable; this yields requirement D-Availability below.
Definition 5.1 A quorum system Q is a dissemination quorum system for a fail-prone system B if the following properties are satisfied.
D-Consistency: ∀Q
1 , Q 2 ∈ Q ∀B ∈ B : Q 1 ∩ Q 2 ⊆ B
D-Availability: ∀B ∈ B ∃Q ∈ Q : B ∩ Q = ∅
A dissemination quorum system will suffice for propagating self-verifying information as in the application described above. The write operation is implemented as described in Sect. 3, and the read operation becomes:
Read. For a client to read a variable x, it queries servers to obtain a set of value/timestamp pairs A = {<v u , t u >} u∈Q for some quorum Q. The client then discards those pairs that are not verifiable (e.g., using an appropriate digital signature verification algorithm) and chooses from the remaining pairs the pair <v, t> with the largest timestamp. v is the result of the read operation.
It is important to note that timestamps must be included as part of the self-verifying information, so they cannot be undetectably altered by faulty servers. In the case of the application described above, existing standards for public key certificates (e.g., [8] ) already require a real-time timestamp in the certificate.
The following lemma states correctness of the above protocol using dissemination quorum systems. The proof is almost identical to that for masking quorum systems.
Lemma 5.2 A read operation that is concurrent with no write operations returns the value written by the last preceding write operation in some serialization of all preceding write operations.
Due to the assumption of self-verifying data, we can also prove in this case the following property.
Lemma 5.3 A read operation that is concurrent with one or more write operations returns either the value written by the last preceding write operation in some serialization of all preceding write operations, or any of the values being written in the concurrent write operations.
The above lemmata imply that the protocol above implements a regular variable [20] . Theorems analogous to the ones given for masking quorum systems above are easily derived for dissemination quorums. Below, we list these results without proof. Example 5.7 (Grid) Let the universe be arranged in a grid as in Example 4.8 above, and let B = {B ⊆ U : |B| = f }, 2f + 1 ≤ √ n. Then, the quorum system
is a dissemination quorum system for B . The load of this system is 
Opaque masking quorum systems
Masking quorums impose a requirement that clients know the fail-prone system B , while there may be reasons that clients should not be required to know this. First, it somewhat complicates the client's read protocol, in particular, when no concise description of B exists. Second, by revealing the failure scenarios for which the system was designed, the system also reveals the failure scenarios to which it is vulnerable, which could be exploited by an attacker to guide an active attack against the system. By not revealing the failprone system to clients, and indeed giving each client only a small fraction of the possible quorums, the system can somewhat obscure (though perhaps not secure in any formal sense) the failure scenarios to which it is vulnerable, especially in the absence of client collusion. In this section we describe one way to modify the masking quorum definition of Sect. 4 to be opaque, i.e., to eliminate the need for clients to know B . In the absence of the client knowing B , the only method of which we are aware for the client to reduce a set of replies from servers to a single reply from the service is via voting, i.e., choosing the reply that occurs most often. In order for this reply to be the correct one, however, we must strengthen the requirements on our quorum systems. Specifically, suppose that the variable x is written with quorum Q 1 , and that subsequently x is read with quorum Q 2 . If B is the set of arbitrarily faulty servers, then (Q 1 ∩ Q 2 ) \ B is the set of correct servers that possess the latest value for x (see Fig. 4 ). In order for the client to obtain this value by vote, this set must be larger than the set of faulty servers that are allowed to respond, i.e., Q 2 ∩ B. Moreover, since these faulty servers can "team up" with the out-of-date but correct servers in an effort to suppress the write operation, the number of correct, up-to-date servers that reply must be no less than the number of faulty or out-of-date servers that can reply, i.e., (Q 2 ∩B)∪(Q 2 \Q 1 ). Finally, to effectively mask failures by any B ∈ B in an asynchronous environment, we add the availability requirement (O-Availability).
Definition 5.9 A quorum system Q is an opaque masking quorum system for a fail-prone system B if the following properties are satisfied.
O2:
Fig. 4. O-Consistency1 and O-Consistency2
O-Consistency2:
Note that O-Consistency1 admits the possibility of equality in size between (
Equality is sufficient since, in the case that the faulty servers "team up" with the correct but out-of-date servers in Q 2 , the value returned from (Q 1 ∩ Q 2 ) \ B will have a higher timestamp than that returned by (Q 2 ∩ B) ∪ (Q 2 \ Q 1 ). Therefore, in the case of a tie, a reader can choose the value with the higher timestamp. It is interesting to note that a strong inequality in O-Consistency1 would permit a correct implementation of a single-reader singer-writer safe variable that does not use timestamps (by taking the majority value in a read operation).
It is not difficult to verify that an opaque masking quorum system enables a client to obtain the correct answer from the service. The write operation is implemented as described in Sect. 3, and the read operation becomes:
Read. For a client to read a variable x, it queries servers to obtain a set of value/timestamp pairs A = {<v u , t u >} u∈Q for some quorum Q. The client chooses the pair <v, t> that appears most often in A, and if there are multiple such pairs, the one with the highest timestamp. The value v is the result of the read operation.
Opaque masking quorum systems, combined with the access protocol described previously, provide the same semantics as regular masking quorum systems. The proof is almost identical to that for regular masking quorums.
Lemma 5.10 A read operation that is concurrent with no write operations returns the value written by the last preceding write operation in some serialization of all preceding write operations.
Below we give several examples of opaque masking quorum systems (or just "opaque quorum systems") and describe their properties. 
The next theorem proves a resilience bound for opaque quorum systems.
Theorem 5.12 Suppose that
There exists an opaque quorum system for B iff n ≥ 5f .
Proof. That n ≥ 5f is sufficient is already demonstrated in Example 5.11 above. Now suppose that Q is an opaque quorum system for B . Fix any
and therefore there is some
Where (1) holds by O-Consistency1. Therefore, we have n ≥ 5f .
Example 5.13 (Partition) Suppose that
that |B i | = c for a fixed constant c > 0. Then, the f -opaque construction of Example 5.11 on the 'super-elements' {B i } (as in Example 4.8), with universe size 3k and a threshold assumption f = 1, yields an opaque quorum system with load 2k+1 3k . Unlike the case for regular masking quorum systems, an open problem is to find a technique for testing whether, given a fail-prone system B , there exists an opaque quorum system for B (other than an exhaustive search of all subsets of 2 U ). In the constructions in Examples 5.11 and 5.13, the resulting quorum systems exhibited loads that at best were constant as a function of n. In the case of masking quorum systems, we were able to exhibit quorum systems whose load decreased as a function of n, namely the grid quorums. A natural question is whether there exists an opaque quorum system for any fail-prone system B that has load that decreases as a function of n. In this section, we answer this question in the negative: we show a lower bound of 1 2 on the load for any opaque quorum system construction, regardless of the fail-prone system. Theorem 5.14 The load of any opaque quorum system is at least
2 . Let w be any strategy for the quorum system Q , and fix any Q 1 ∈ Q . Then, the total load induced by w on the elements of Q 1 is:
, there must be some server in Q 1 that suffers a load at least 1 2 . We now present a generic construction of an opaque quorum system for B = {∅} and increasingly large universe sizes n, that has a load that tends to 1 2 as n grows. We give this construction primarily to show that in at least some cases the lower bound of 1 2 is tight; due to the requirement that B = {∅}, this construction is not of practical use for coping with Byzantine failures.
Example 5.15
Suppose that the universe of servers is U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } where n = 2 for some > 2, and that B = {∅}. Consider the n × n Hadamard matrix H( ), constructed recursively as follows:
H( ) has the property that H( )H( ) T = nI, where I is the n × n identity matrix. Using well-known inductive arguments [14, Ch. 14] , it can be shown that (i) the first row and column consist entirely of −1's, (ii) the i-th row and i-th column, for each i ≥ 2, has 1's in n−1 can be achieved, e.g., with a strategy that assigns equal probability to each quorum.
Faulty clients
So far, we have been concerned with providing a consistent service to a set of correct clients. In this section, we extend our treatment to address faulty clients in addition to faulty servers. Since updates may now be generated by faulty clients, we can make no assumption of self-verifying 1 . If a server receives <update, Q, v, t> from a client c, if t ∈ Tc, and if the server has not previously received from c a message <update, Q , v , t > where either t = t and v / = v or t > t, then the server sends <echo, Q, v, t> to each member of Q. 2. If a server receives identical echo messages <echo, Q, v, t> from every server in Q, then it sends <ready, Q, v, t> to each member of Q. 3. If a server receives identical ready messages <ready, Q, v, t> from a set B + of servers, such that B + ⊆ B for all B ∈ B , then it sends <ready, Q, v, t> to every member of Q if it has not done so already. 4. If a server receives identical ready messages <ready, Q, v, t> from a set Q − of servers, such that for some B ∈ B , Q − = Q \ B, then (i) if t is greater than the timestamp it currently holds, then it updates its variable and timestamp to v and t, respectively, and (ii) regardless of whether it updates the variable and timestamp, it sends an acknowledgment message to c where Tc t. data, and thus use masking quorum systems (Sect. 4) to implement the service. We focus on ensuring the consistency of the data stored at the replicated service as seen by correct clients only. A difficulty in handling faulty clients is that a faulty writer might send different updates to different servers and may fail to contact a full quorum. We therefore modify the write protocol to prevent clients from leaving the service in an inconsistent state, and to guarantee that updates propagate to (at least) a full quorum. We maintain availability of the service despite the possibly malicious behavior by any number of clients, so that a correct client can always complete a write operation with as little as one available quorum.
The treatment here provides a single-writer multi-reader safe variable semantics (ignoring reads by faulty clients). Since the initial conference publication of this work [23] , single-writer objects with stronger semantics in the case of faulty clients have been constructed using Byzantine quorums and have been used to solve the distributed consensus problem [24] . Other work has extended the treatment here to provide multi-writer variables [25] . An alternative and general correctness condition for shared objects accessed by faulty clients has been developed in [26] , which our protocol here also satisfies. For brevity, however, here we continue in the framework of the previous sections.
The write protocol performed by a client is changed in that a writer computes the timestamp locally, without consulting the servers, and in that it denotes the quorum it attempts to access in the update request. We replace the write operation of Sect. 3 by the following:
Write. For a client c to write the value v, it chooses a timestamp t ∈ T c greater than any value it has chosen before, and then performs the following two steps: (i) it chooses a quorum Q and sends an update message <update, Q, v, t> to each server in Q, and (ii) if after some timeout period, it has not received an acknowledgement from every server in Q, it repeats (i) (and (ii)).
Every server that receives an update message from a client engages in an "update" protocol to guarantee uniqueness of the value associated with a timestamp and its propagation to a full quorum. The protocol is presented in Fig. 5 .
In order to argue correctness for this protocol, we have to adapt the definition of operation precedence and operation duration to allow for the behavior of a faulty client. The reason is that it is unclear how to define when an operation by a faulty client begins or ends, as the client can behave outside the specification of any protocol. We make use of the following terminology: Definition 6.1 We say that a server delivers an update <v, t> when it receives <ready, Q, v, t> from each server in the set Q − = Q \ B for some fail-prone set B (step 4 of the update protocol in Fig. 5 ).
We now say that a write operation that writes v with timestamp t begins when the first correct server receives <update, Q, v, t>, and ends when all correct servers in some quorum have delivered the update. Note that by this definition, a write operation by a faulty client could last arbitrarily long, and could overlap other writes by the same client. Nevertheless, carrying over the remainder of the precedence definition, we have that the write protocol together with the update protocol in Fig. 5 Proof. To deliver <v, t>, a correct server must receive a ready message from some correct server. Moreover, the first <ready, Q, v, t> message from a correct server is sent only after it receives <echo, Q, v, t> from each member of Q. Since, a correct member sends <echo, Q, v, t> only if it first receives <update, Q, v, t>, this proves the lemma. Proof. As argued in the previous lemma, for a correct server to deliver <v, t>, <echo, Q, v, t> must have been sent by all servers in Q. Similarly, <echo, Q , v , t> must have been sent by all servers in Q . Since every two quorums intersect in (at least) one correct server, and since any correct server sends <echo, * ,v, t> for at most one valuev, v must be identical to v .
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Let W denote the set of write operations preceding the read. Note that by Lemma 6.4, any value/timestamp pair in W is well defined, i.e., the same value corresponds to any timestamp at all correct servers that deliver it. By definition, every write in W was delivered to a full quorum, and by assumption and Lemma 6.3, no correct server has delivered any write outside W . Therefore, by the construction of masking quorum systems, the read operation will return the value written in the write operation in W with the highest timestamp. So, it suffices to argue that there is a serialization of the writes in W in which this write operation appears last, or in other words, that this write operation precedes no other write operation in W . This results, however, from the fact that there is a single writer and that servers echo an update request only if its timestamp is higher than the one they have in store, and so any later write operation has a higher timestamp.
In addition, we argue liveness and completeness of our protocol as follows: Lemma 6.5 (Propagation) If a correct server delivers <v, t>, then eventually there exists a quorum Q ∈ Q such that every correct server in Q delivers <v, t>.
To prove this lemma, we make use of the following fact: Proof. Since both the client and all of the members of Q are correct, <update, Q, v, t> will be received and echoed by every member in Q. Consequently, all the servers in Q will send <ready, Q, v, t> messages to the members of Q, and will eventually deliver <v, t>.
Conclusions
The literature contains an abundance of protocols that use quorums for accessing replicated data. This approach is appealing for constructing replicated services as it allows for increasing the availability and efficiency of the service while maintaining its consistency. Our work extends this successful approach to environments where both the servers and the clients of a service may deviate from their prescribed behavior in arbitrary ways. We introduced a new class of quorum systems, namely masking quorum systems, and devised protocols that use these quorums to enhance the availability of systems prone to Byzantine failures. We also explored two variations of our quorum systems, namely dissemination and opaque masking quorums, and for all of these classes of quorums we provided various constructions and analyzed the load they impose on the system. Our work leaves a number of intriguing open challenges and directions for future work. One is to characterize the average performance of our quorum constructions and their load in less-than-ideal scenarios, e.g., when failures occur. Also, in this work we described only quorum systems that are uniform, in the sense that any quorum is possible for both read and write operations. In practice it may be beneficial to employ quorum systems with distinguished read quorums and write quorums, with consistency requirements imposed only between pairs consisting of at least one write quorum. Although this does not seem to improve our lower bounds on the overall load that can be achieved, it may allow greater flexibility in trading between the availability of reads and writes.
